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Abstract. While RFID technology has greatly facilitated the supply
chain management, designing a secure, visible, and eﬃcient RFID-
enabled supply chain system is still a challenge since the three equally im-
portant requirements (i.e., security, visibility, and eﬃciency) may conﬂict
to each other. Few research works have been conducted to address these
issues simultaneously. In this paper, we observe the diﬀerent security re-
quirements in RFID-enabled supply chain environments and diﬀerentiate
the simpliﬁed model into two security levels. Accordingly, dual security
modes are properly deﬁned in our RFID setting. In the relatively secure
environment, our system is set to the weak security mode, the tagged
products can be processed in a highly eﬃcient way. When in the strong
security mode, our system guarantees a high level of security, while its
eﬃciency is lower than that in the weak security mode. A set of RFID
tag/reader protocols to facilitate the duel security modes are presented.
Their security, visibility and eﬃciency are analyzed and compared with
the relevant works.
1 Introduction
RFID systems consist of two main components: tags and readers. Tags are radio
transponders attached to physical objects, while radio transceivers, or readers,
query these tags for identifying information about the objects to which tags
are attached. RFID technology, when combined with internet and networking
technology, enables product information to be collected, integrated, shared, and
queried at various levels (e.g., item, pallet, case, and container) in real time in
a supply chain. RFID technology has been widely envisioned to have signiﬁcant
impact on the economy world-wide as an inevitable replacement of barcodes in
the near future, which may facilitate the creation of secure, visible, and eﬃcient
supply chains. As a result, EPCglobal Network [2] is being formed to provide
an open and standard interface to process RFID information in supply chain
management.
The current EPCglobal Network standards depend entirely on honest supply
chain partners to realize supply chain visibility. Few security mechanisms have
been developed to ensure that the tracking services are conﬁdential, veriﬁable,
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and accountable in the presence of realistic and malicious attacks, especially
those coming from corrupted supply chain partners. Most of RFID technologies
have focused on protecting a single RFID channel [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] without
considering the relationship among supply chain parties. Such techniques cannot
be directly used to protect the sharing of information among supply chain parties.
We develop a new security solution for RFID-enabled supply chain systems.
In our solution, even a valid supply chain party, if not authorized, cannot track
RFID tags after the ownership handover of the tags to other supply chain par-
ties. On the other hand, an authorized party can have full supply chain visibility
to track a tagged item in a supply chain. A root secret, shared between a trusted
authority and each tag, is used to guarantee the anti-track and track/visibility
properties. To achieve better eﬃciency, we classify the supply chain environ-
ments into two security levels. In an environment where insiders or outsiders
can actively interact with a tag for the purpose of tracking, we set the system to
strong security mode so as to maintain high security. In an environment where
active attacks are not possible (e.g., within the territory of a supply chain party),
we can set the system to weak security mode to achieve high processing speed.
We use a binary switch on the tag to control the security modes. A set of RFID
tag/reader protocols like tag reading protocol, security mode switching protocol
and secret updating protocol, to facilitate the duel security modes are presented.
We analyze the schemes in terms of security, visibility and eﬃciency. At last, our
solution is compared with the relevant works.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
a simpliﬁed system model and architecture for RFID-enabled supply chains.
In Section 3, we present our protocols to protect RFID-enabled supply chain
systems. In Section 4, we analyze our protocols in terms of security, visibility,
and eﬃciency. In Section 5, we discuss the related works. Finally, Section 6
concludes this paper.
2 Model
Assumptions. In this paper, we focus on the attacks conducted on the wireless
communications between RFID readers and tags. The adversaries can be either
supply chain outsiders or insiders (i.e., dishonest supply chain parties). The ad-
versaries are assumed to have the power to listen in communication channels,
counterfeit as a valid supply chain party, to initiate, delete, modify, or trans-
fer messages between RFID tags and readers. We do not consider the physical
attacks, denial of service attacks, and side-channel attacks. We further assume
that the communications between a supply chain partner and its RFID readers,
and the communications between supply chain parties are secure, which can be
protected by standard security techniques without limitation of resources.
Requirements. As discussed in existing RFID literatures, common security re-
quirements of RFID tags include unlinkability, conﬁdentiality, etc, nonetheless,
applying RFID tags in supply chain environments introduces some unique needs
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such as supply chain visibility and extra eﬃciency. In the following, we list the
details of the requirements for RFID system when deployed in the supply chain.
The security requirements of RFID-enabled supply chain are summarized
in [12]. We increment the requirements to include forward and backward secrecy
and de-synchronization resilience. The list of security requirements is given be-
low: (i) Authoritative access: Only legitimate readers of an authorized party
are allowed to identify and update a tag. (ii) Authenticity of tags: In a sup-
ply chain link, only legitimate RFID tags delivered by previous party will be
accepted by the next party. (iii) Unlinkability: Weak unlinkability and strong
unlinkability can be used to describe the security level of anti-tracking. Weak
unlinkability requires that an unauthorized reader cannot link the responses of a
tag interrogated before and after it is processed by an authorized party. Strong
unlinkability requires that an unauthorized reader cannot link any two replies
to the same tag. (iv) Forward and backward secrecy: If the communication be-
tween a tag and a party is compromised, it will not aﬀect the security of the
communication between the tag and any other party in the supply chain. (v)
De-synchronization resilience: RFID communication protocol is resilient to the
attacks that are targeted towards de-synchronizing a tag and a reader.
Besides security, supply chain visibility must be maintained in supply chain
management. It means that the manager of the supply chain or any authorized
party should be able to track the movement of RFID tags. The enhancement
on supply chain visibility is the most attractive feature that RFID technology
brings to the traditional supply chain management. It allows companies to track
and monitor the progress of material ﬂow without ineﬃcient bar code scanning.
Due to mass product exchanging, the eﬃciency of RFID technology is cru-
cial in supply chain management. Without incorporating security and visibility
features, hundreds of read operations can be performed per second between a
reader and tags. The processing speed should not be delayed by adding security
and visibility features.
We stress that the three requirements (i.e., security, visibility, and eﬃciency)
are equally important in supply chain environments. Our goal is to propose a
practical solution for RFID-based supply chain systems under the three require-
ments with the lowest possible cost.
Architecture. Our solution involves four types of entities as shown in Figure 1: (i)
a supply chain manager which is a trusted authority, denoted by TA; (ii) indepen-
dent supply chain parties denoted by Pi; (iii)RFID readers inside a partner, which
are collectively referred to as Ri controlled by its corresponding party Pi, and a
back-end database referred to as Di; (iv) RFID tags denoted by Tj .
The architecture we proposed is suitable for various types of supply chain
structures [3] and compatible with contemporary EPCglobal network architec-
ture [2]. In a third-party logistics (3PL) supply chain, TA can be the shipping
company, which is specialized in handling the shipping issues in the supply chain.
In the vendor managed inventory (VMI) supply chains, the vendor manages all
the delivering of products; thus, it is straightforward for the vendor to take
the role of TA. For the collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment
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Fig. 1. A simpliﬁed RFID system architecture
(CPFR) supply chains, a supply chain hub is TA, which coordinates real-time
sharing of supply chain information among supply chain parties. Finally, in sup-
ply network (SN), the situation is similar but more complex than in CPFR
supply chains, where TA can be an existing supply chain hub or a dominant
supply chain party.
3 Protocols
Since RFID tags will be used in vast numbers in supply chains, it is desired
that the security design of the tags should be as cheap as possible. To achieve
this goal, our protocols are designed to use passive tags that are equipped with
pseudo-random number generators, standard XOR⊕ and hash H(·) calculations.
A database is initialized by TA and sent to each supply chain party before the
party can identify a batch of tags. With the help of the database, a supply chain
party can switch security modes of RFID tags multiple times. Before a supply
chain party sends a batch of tags to the next party in ownership handover, the
current party needs to update the secret information in each tag. After ownership
handover, the party can no longer identify the tags or track their movement.
3.1 Initialization
Tag initialization. Before the ﬁrst supply chain party P1 starts processing tagged
products, TA will initiate three values (αj , β1↔j , switch) and embed them in
each tag Tj in a secure manner.
– αj is the tag root secret of length , which is ﬁxed and shared between TA
and the tag. The root secret is used to identify the tag uniquely.
– βi↔j is a temporary secret of length , which is shared between supply chain
party Pi and tag Tj . The two parameters i and j of βi↔j denote the identity
number of the supply chain party and the tag separately. This secret is
initiated by TA to be β1↔j . The temporal secret βi↔j will be updated by
Pi to βi+1↔j before ownership handover to Pi+1.
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– switch is a binary value used to indicate the security mode of a tag. This
value is initiated to be ‘on’ for a strong security mode and it can be subse-
quently switched to ‘oﬀ’ for a weak security mode.
Database Initialization. Each party Pi maintains a database Di in its local stor-
age where each tuple in the database corresponds to a tag. Di contains all RFID
information with respect to a batch of tags except for tag root secrets α. Di
consists of ﬁve attributes (β, x, p, s, switch), where (β, switch) are deﬁned the
same as in tag initialization, (x, p, s) are deﬁned below.
– Tag response x: Tag response to be received from the corresponding RFID
tag (in weak security mode). When the tag is on strong security mode, the
value of this attribute is set to NULL.
– Pointer p: An octet string containing an address where the business infor-
mation relevant to the tag is stored. An alternative approach is to store
information in this ﬁeld directly. Obviously, it trades the storage cost for
communication eﬃciency.
– Status s: Binary bit; s = 1 means that the corresponding RFID tag has been
processed; otherwise not. We call an entry is unmarked if its value is zero.
Reader initialization. When the Pi is to handover a batch of tagged products
to Pi+1, it updates the tag temporal secrets and informs TA that Pi+1 is the
next party. Then TA will distribute the database Di+1 to Pi+1 through a secure
channel (e.g., SSL).
3.2 Tag Reading
Upon receiving Di from TA and the tagged products from Pi−1, supply chain
partner Pi can read any tag Tj in either the strong security mode if switch is on
or in the weak security mode if switch is oﬀ.
1. Ri → Tj : r1, where r1 is a random number of length  generated by the
reader.
2. Tj → Ri: On receiving r1, the tag sends the reply (r2, x) to the reader, where
x = H(r1||r2||βi↔j) and r2 is a number of length . If the tag is in strong
security mode, r2 is a fresh random number generated by the tag; otherwise,
r2 = 0.
The tag reading protocol is illustrated in Figure 2. In the weak security
mode, Ri can pre-compute the response of each tag xj and store them in
Di. On receiving a response x , Ri identiﬁes the tag if it can ﬁnd a record
dj = 〈βi↔j , xj , sj , switchj〉 in Di such that xj = x and sj = 0. In the strong
security mode, however, the response of each tag cannot be pre-computed due
to the use of fresh tag random number; the value of x is set to NULL in each
tuple of Di in this case. Given a response (r2, x), the reader identiﬁes a tag
by searching all of the unmarked(s = 0) tuples in Di until it ﬁnds a tuple dj
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Reader Ri Tag Tj
[Di] [βi↔j ]
Chooses r1 ∈ R. r1
r2, x
Sets r2 = 0 if Tj is in the weak
security mode, else chooses r2 ∈ R;
computes x = H(r1‖r2‖βi↔j).
Searches a value of β in Di
that H(r1‖r2‖β) = x.
if found, then tag is identiﬁed;
else, the identiﬁcation falis.
Fig. 2. Tag reading protocol
which satisﬁes x = H(r1||r2||βi↔j). For each identiﬁed tag Tj , the reader sets
its status sj = 1. If pj is not empty, the reader can also obtain relevant product
information following the pointer pj.
The above reading process can be performed multiple times by supply chain
partner Pi if necessary.
3.3 Security Mode Switching
Once the party Pi receives Di from TA, it can change the security mode of
its tags in diﬀerent environments. Although the strong security mode is secure
against both active attacks and passive attacks, the RFID tags can be processed
more eﬃciently in the weak security mode in an environment where the active
attacks are impossible. We design a security mode switching protocol below.
1. Ri → Tj : To update the security mode of tag Tj , the reader chooses a fresh
random number r3 and computes a = βi↔j ⊕ r3, and b = H(switch0||a||r3),
where switch0 is the new value of switch. The reader then sends the triple
(switch0, a, b) to the tag.
2. Tj → Ri: When tag Tj receives (switch0, a, b), it computes r3 = βi↔j ⊕ a,
and checks whether b = H(switch0||a||r3) holds; if so, it updates switch =
switch0. After update of switch value, the tag Tj will send a conﬁrmation
(r2, x) back to the reader, where r2 is generated based on the switch value
and x = H(r2||r3||βi↔j).
3. Ri: Upon receiving (r2, x), the reader Ri conﬁrms the update of switch by
checking whether x = H(r2||r3||βi↔j).
The protocol is also illustrated in Figure 3. Since a tag will send a conﬁrmation
to the reader after security mode update, any failure can be detected by the
reader.
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Reader Ri Tag Tj
[Di] [βi↔j ]
Chooses r3 ∈ R,




Computes r3 = a⊕ βi↔j ;
if b = H(switch0‖a‖r3),
switch← switch0,
choose r2 ∈ R,
computes x = H(βi↔j‖r2‖r3),
If x = H(βi↔j‖r2‖r3),
the security mode switching secesses;
else, it fails.
Fig. 3. Security mode switching protocol
3.4 Ownership Handover
Ownership handover is performed between two supply chain parties Pi and Pi+1
with RFID tags in weak security mode without TA’s active involvement. Before
the handover, Pi will update the temporal secrets of its tags and informs TA,
who will send Di+1 to Pi+1 in a secure manner. Note that the database Di+1 is
not needed during the handover process.
In order to prevent the tagged products from being tracked by party Pi af-
ter ownership handover, the tag’s temporary secret must be updated from βi↔j
to βi+1↔j . This updating process is performed by Pi before handover. With-
out being appropriately updated, a tag will not be accepted by Pi+1 in the
handover process (see below). The update of tag temporal secrets guarantees
that only Pi+1 can access the tags although the update is conducted by Pi.
This is under the assumption that Pi cannot get access to tag root secrets
nor the new database Di+1. The temporary secret updating protocol is shown
in Figure 4. During ownership handover, both parties need to agree upon a
list of the tagged products and report the agreed list to TA for supply chain
visibility.
Reader Ri Tag Tj
[Di] [βi↔j ]
Chooses r3 ∈ R,
computes a = βi↔j ⊕ r3,
b = H(a‖r3).
a, b
Computes r3 = a⊕ βi↔j ;
if b = H(a‖r3),
computes βi+1↔j = H(αj‖βi↔j).
Fig. 4. Temporary secret updating protocol
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During ownership handover, both parties need to agree upon a list of the
tagged products and report the agreed list to TA for supply chain visibility.
1. For a batch of tagged products to be handed over to Pi+1, Pi performs
tag reading protocol with the same random number r1 of length  and
records a list L of responses xj from all tags in the batch, where xj =
H(r1||r2||βi+1↔j), r2 = 0. Then, Pi sends r1 to Pi+1.
2. Upon receiving r1, Pi+1 performs the reading protocol with the same random
number r1 and records a list L′ of all responses x′j from all tags in the batch,
where x′j = H(r1||r2||βi+1↔j).
3. Pi and Pi+1 compares the two list L and L′. If the lists match, then both
sign on the matched list with the current time-stamp and keep a copy of the
signed list. Party Pi sends the signed list to the TA for supply chain visibility.
If the two lists do not match, the two parties will settle the disagreement
till they reach an agreement. After the handover process, Pi+1 should switch
the tags into the strong security mode if Pi is still around.
The ownership handover process is illustrated in Figure 5. Note that Pi is
responsible to report to TA since it is for Pi’s interest to ﬁnalize the handover
process as early as possible. TA is responsible to coordinate the handover process
and manage the supply chain visibility accordingly. Our system remains secure
even the tags are set to the weak security mode in the ownership handover pro-
cess. The reason is that the tagged products remain static in this process; there
is no point to track tags while they are not moving. After ownership handover,
the tags are in Pi+1’s control, who will keep the tags secure by switching to ap-
propriate security modes. If Pi has not updated some tags appropriately before
ownership handover due to de-synchronization attacks or communication errors,
both parties will detect the mismatch; Pi can re-update the tags to facilitate the
handover. Therefore, our solution has the de-synchronization resilience property.
Fig. 5. Ownership handover process between Pi and Pi+1
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4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze our protocols with respect to the requirements of
security, visibility, and eﬃciency. We summarize our analysis results in the form
of statements. Proofs and explanations of the statements will be given in the full
version of this paper.
STATEMENT 4.1 (Authoritative access to RFID tags). Only a valid reader
with a tag’s temporary secret authorized by TA is able to conduct reading and
updating on the tag successfully.
STATEMENT 4.2 (Authenticity of tags).Given two numbers r1 and r2, the
probability for an adversary without the knowledge of βi↔j to ﬁnd a valid response
x such that x = H(r1||r2||βi↔j) holds is 12 , where  is the length of βi↔j .
STATEMENT 4.3 (Weak unlinkability). Given a response x1 from a tag
prior to being processed by party Pi and a response x2 from a tag after being
processed by Pi, it is computationally infeasible for a rogue reader to determine
whether x1 and x2 is from the same tag.
STATEMENT 4.4 (Strong unlinkability). A tag is strong unlinkable in the
strong security mode. It is also strong unlinkable in the weak security mode in
an environment of no active attacks.
STATEMENT 4.5 (Forward and backward secrecy). If the protocol com-
munication between a tag and a reader is compromised in certain party, it will
not aﬀect the security of the protocol communication between the tag and the
reader in any other parties.
STATEMENT 4.6 (De-synchronization resilience). The temporary secret
updating protocol and the security mode switching protocol in our security solu-
tion are resilient to de-synchronization attacks.
STATEMENT 4.7 (Visibility). While unauthorized entities are prevented
from tracking the movement of material ﬂow, authorized entities have access to
the information about where and when a tag is processed.
STATEMENT 4.8 (Eﬃciency). In the weak security mode, the time com-
plexity for an authorized reader to identify a batch of n tags is O(n logn). In the
strong security mode, the time complexity is O(n2).
The bottleneck of most RFID-enabled supply chain systems including ours
is the process of identifying a large number of tags by each reader. According
to [16,17], we roughly estimate that it takes about 210 CPU cycles of a Pentium
CPU to perform a hash function (e.g., SHA-1) for digesting a 128-bit message and
about 40 CPU cycles per sort operation for merge-sort or quick-sort algorithms.
We assume that there are 220 tags in each batch, and a 1-GHz Pentium machine
is used in each reader’s servant computer. In the weak security mode, it requires
about 800ns in database search for identifying each tag. In the strong security
mode, however, the batch size is better below 104 so that a reader can identify
about 500 tags per second. Since an RFID reader usually can perform about 100
times reading, the speed of searching tags in database is suﬃciently fast enough
as it is higher than 100 tags per second.
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5 Related Work
A bundle of research papers addressing RFID security and privacy problems
have been published (refer to [4] for a detailed literature survey) in recent years.
Among them, tens of (privacy enhanced) tag/reader mutual authentication pro-
tocols have been proposed in the literature such as the HB family of RFID
protocols [5,6], symmetric cipher based protocols [7,8, 9], and lightweight prim-
itive based protocols [10, 11]. Unfortunately, all of these RFID protocols have
focused on protecting tag to reader communication in a single domain, where
no cross-domain relationship is considered among various supply chain parties.
Therefore, their techniques cannot be directly used to ensure the information
sharing protocols interacting multiple supply chain parties.
In this section, we compare our solution with the most related works [12,14,13]
on RFID authentication protocols in supply chain environments. We realize that
these works might have been attacked in some way [15], their original ideas are
still meritable and worth being reviewed. A summary of our comparison is given
in Table 1.
In [12], Li and Ding proposed a de-centralized solution for secure RFID com-
munications in supply chains. In their solution, an access key is shared between
each tag and each supply chain party. The access key of a tag can be updated
by the current supply chain party before the tag is handed over to the next
supply chain party. Since the updated access key is shared between the current
supply chain party and the next supply chain party, their solution is vulnerable
to insider attacks without backward or forward secrecy. Their solution is similar
to our solution in the weak security mode in a sense that only weak unlinkability
is provided. The time complexity of their solution is also similar to our solution
in the weak security mode, which is O(n log n) for processing each batch of tags.
Since there is no trusted authority involved in their solution, the supply chain
visibility should be maintained by each party’s database in a distributed manner.
Juels, Pappu, and Parno proposed an interesting solution for secure RFID-
enabled supply chains [13]. In their work, a secret sharing method is used to
break a secret key to multiple shares, with each share stored in a single tag
along with the cipher of the tag id encrypted with the secret key. An authorized
supply chain party, which is supposed to get access to a large number of tags
can collect enough shares to recover the secret key, and thus decrypt the tags’
IDs. An adversary is assumed to have limited access to the tags; thus, he or
she cannot recover the secret key nor decrypt any tags’ IDs. It is clear that this
solution does not have any unlinkability feature. Anyone can track the movement
of a tag even if it is encrypted. The advantage of this solution is that it can be
directly used with the current EPC Gen2 tags [1] without any cryptographic
extensions; therefore, the cost of tags is apparently lower than other solutions
which have to incorporate hash and random number generation computations
in tags.
Song proposed an RFID ownership transfer protocol recently [14]. In her so-
lution, a supply chain party and a tag share a couple of secrets (t, s), where
t = h(s). The tag stores the value t, and the reader authorizes itself to the tag
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Table 1. Comparison of our solution with three other solutions
Unlinkability Visibility Eﬃciency Cost
(anti-tracking) (handover) (tag search) (tag)
[12] Weak Distributed Batch process Moderate
[13] Null Distributed Decryption Low
[14] Strong Distributed Tag by tag Moderate
Our solution Strong Centralized Switch Moderate
by proving its possession of s. In ownership handover, the current party must be
online to help the next party to identify a tag; then, the current party will send
the tag secret to the next party, which will use the secret information to update
the tag secret to a new value. To provide strong unlinkability, each tag will gen-
erate its reply based on a fresh random number, which is similar to our solution
in the strong security mode. The weakness of this solution is its low eﬃciency,
especially in the handover process which takes O(n2) time for processing n tags
one by one.
Comparing to the above works, our proposal solution is the only solution that
involves a trusted authority. Therefore the supply chain visibility can be easily
maintained in a centralized manner. On the one hand, our solution provides
strong unlinkability under the assumption that the weak security mode is used
in a relative secure environment of no active attacks. On the other hand, it
can switch to the weak security mode for higher eﬃciency in tag reading. It
thus provides higher eﬃciency in certain environment without downgrading the
security features. In terms of tag cost, our solution is similar to [12, 14] as it
involves random number generation and hash computations in tags. Note that
our solution is suitable for the RFID tags of cost around US$0.5 and RFID reader
of cost around US$1000. Such RFID readers and tags are currently available
in the market and their costs are aﬀordable in supply chain management at
container, pallet, or case level (probably not at the item level).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the security, visibility, and eﬃciency issues for
RFID-enabled supply chain systems. High eﬃciency is particularly desirable in
RFID-enabled supply chains since a large quantity of tagged products are rou-
tinely processed and exchanged among multiple supply chain parties such as
suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. In order to enhance the ef-
ﬁciency of a RFID-enabled supply chain system without sacriﬁcing its security,
we distinguish the environments into two secure levels. In a relatively secure
environment with no active attacks, our RFID system can be set to the weak
security mode so as to provide high processing speed. While in a relatively less
secure environment that is exposed to active attacks, our RFID system can be
switched to the strong security mode so as to maintain strong unlinkability. In
the future, we are interested in investigating the scalability of our solution and
verifying its practicality in real EPCglobal network or simulated environments.
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